Friends and neighbors,
The third joint hearing of the Senate’s Transportation and Judiciary Committees took place Thursday, July 9, with the objective of investigating the state’s general response to the riots, which agency was in charge the lack of clarity in the National Guard’s mission, and why the governor waited so long to call them in.
For a recap of what happened, please take a few minutes to watch this video we played at the beginning of the hearing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r65YvLAv5Ts&. The video is also embedded at the bottom of this post.
First, we heard from Major General Jon Jensen, commander of the Minnesota National Guard. He provided some background about how the guard operates, the differences between the guard and local law enforcement, and what he needs to be successful.
He said that one of the issues he faced was that initially the guard was called in without many specifics. He acknowledged that when they are asked to step in without knowing exactly what the tasks are or what the duration of the mission is, it is very difficult for his troops to be successful. In this case, he didn’t have a list of specific priorities until 3 pm on Friday. Prior to that, his mission lacked specific locations and points of contact necessary for success.
In the most striking moment of his testimony, he was asked if earlier mobilization of the National Guard would have prevented rioting and damage. His answer: “In my unprofessional law enforcement position: yes. In my professional military position: yes.”
Later in the hearing, we asked Public Safety Commissioner John Harrington if an earlier intervention would have prevented the rioting and damage. Like Gen. Jensen, Commissioner Harrington responded affirmatively.
At one point, Commissioner Harrington was asked if it wasn’t obvious by Tuesday or Wednesday that the peaceful protests were escalating into something that would soon be out of control. The Commissioner said that it was not obvious, and his initial assessment was that it would be only a one- or two-day event. In my view, this is a staggering misjudgment not just in hindsight, but even given the information we had at the time. It was clear that state leadership failed to recognize that events were spiraling into something incredibly dangerous, and it was just as evident early on that local law enforcement was overwhelmed and underprepared for what was coming.
Finally, Commissioner Harrington failed to provide any clarity about who was in charge during the most pivotal moments of the riots. At the governor’s press conference on Friday morning, May 29, the governor said the state was taking charge of the response. Yet, during his testimony today, Commissioner Harrington said that at no point was Minneapolis in a position of subservience; he framed it as more of a team effort, with each individual agency running their own operation.
This is an important piece of information for which we need a definite answer. Minnesotans watched the situation in Minneapolis worsen for several days, with a slow and unclear response from the National Guard and other law enforcement, and it is still unclear who was making important decisions over the course of that week.
One thing we do know after several hours of questions and testimony: Gov. Walz and Commissioner Harrington failed to recognize the threat to public safety in time. Commissioner Harrington works for Gov. Walz, and only the governor can call in the National Guard. The level of violence was clearly escalating rapidly, but they allowed the riots to persist for five nights before an appropriate level of personnel was put in place to stop it. The situation became so dire that the governor had no alternative but to fully mobilize the entire National Guard. According to Gen. Jensen, this had not been done since World War II.
From the testimony we heard, it is clear there were opportunities early on to avoid that level of desperation and danger, but poor decision-making and an alarming leadership vacuum caused the situation to spiral into the dire events we all witnessed.